Author Archives: "Kilgore Trout"

Guest Blog: Salmon Declines and Hatchery Options

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(Editor’s Note: From time to time, the California Fisheries Blog gets requests for guest posts. We like to accommodate requests for posts that we feel, at our sole discretion, are substantive and thought-provoking. Though we discourage pseudonyms, we may, as here, allow posts without attribution when such posts allow a platform to speak out for persons who are professionally constrained. We reserve the right to edit guest posts for clarity. As with all posts on the California Fisheries Blog, guest posts do not represent the policy or opinions of CSPA.)

By “Kilgore Trout”

On Saturday (March 18, 2023), Sep Hendrickson’s “California Sportsmen” radio show hosted James Stone, current president of the Nor-Cal Guides and Sportsmen’s Association. The Association recently lobbied to close the California salmon fishing season for 2023. The discussion raised several interesting issues about the status and management of salmon.

Mr. Stone questioned why regulators did not close the salmon fishery earlier than this year. He noted that in 6 of the last 8 years, the annual escapement of Sacramento fall-run Chinook salmon was below the minimum conservation objective of 122,000 adults, a dismal 75% failure rate for forecasters.

As background, the Sacramento fall-run Chinook is the dominant salmon population commercially fished offshore of California. The population is an aggregate of hatchery and natural production, dominated by hatchery production. A year’s escapement is the abundance of adults that return (in the fall) to spawn in the Sacramento River, its tributaries, and hatcheries. The following spring, the fall-run Chinook offspring of natural-origin emerge from the gravel, smolt, and migrate seaward; the hatchery-origin fish artificially produced by broodstock matings are fed and reared as fry and smolts (in raceways or ponds), then released near the hatchery, or trucked to the estuary or Bay for release.

Sep and James agreed that all too often, 100% of California’s recent salmon declines are blamed on climate change and droughts, not factors like overfishing after years of low escapement. Indeed, a NOAA study conducted after the 2008 closure of the California salmon fishery attributed the collapse primarily to poor ocean conditions, but also noted contributing factors like dry inland conditions and fishing.

Sep and James continued to discuss water management in California’s Central Valley. James reminded listeners that California’s Fish and Game Code 5937 requires dam operators to release water to protect fish. This is correct, and it seems that conservation objectives for salmon (like suitable river temperatures and minimum escapement numbers) should be established to account for environmental variations like hot summers and dry winters that contribute to poor brood years. What’s the point of establishing salmon protections if we scream “Emergency!” and toss protections aside whenever consecutive dry years put agricultural or municipal water users in a short-term bind?

But water management to conserve salmon is not as simple as host Sep Hendrickson framed it when he contended, “There is water behind dams that is oxygenated that can be added and cool at any time they want to; they choose not to.” There isn’t always enough water, and it’s not as simple as saying that politicians simply choose not to release it from dams.

Salmon juveniles emerging from the gravel near Redding must travel hundreds of river miles downstream, where they enter and transit the Delta and Bay to reach the Pacific. That means the Sacramento River must be cold enough for salmon from Redding to the Bay. At the same time, water is released from reservoir storage for agricultural and municipal uses. For there to be enough cold water in the bottom strata of Shasta Reservoir to cool the Sacramento River for salmon, water released from the reservoir in any year must both keep the river cold and retain enough water in storage so that it stays cold later in the year. Shasta’s operators must also retain enough water in storage to allow cold water management in the following year if the following year is dry.

There isn’t space here for a full discussion of Sacramento River water supply and use, or the constraints on achieving temperature (and other) requirements for salmon. This would involve considering complex topics like salmon biology, climate, flood control, drought management, federal water contracts, State water rights, Delta salinity, ocean conditions, and others. But the issues are more complex than politicians (like our Governor) simply choosing not to release water for salmon.

Recognizing the gravity of the Sacramento fall-run Chinook collapse, James Stone warned, “If we don’t raise more hatchery fish, we could possibly lose the fall run forever.” Sep Hendrickson responded, “We need a state-of-the-art hatchery. We can do this state with one hatchery, centrally located that handles everything…” James Stone told listeners they could join the Nor-Cal Guides and Sportsmen’s Association, which has lobbied since 2019 for funds (up to $100 million) for a new hatchery on the mainstem Sacramento River. Stone described it as a modern facility that would allow the trucking of fish and the return of fish, and help protect our stocks for many years. The hatchery’s objective would be to “re-colonize and re-populate the Sacramento River with hatchery fish” and “get them to spawn in the rivers and start reproducing the natural spawn.” Stone added that a healthy river is the best hatchery because it could produce millions more salmon eggs than a hatchery.

Getting funds could help if the objective of “…reproducing the natural spawn” could be achieved by supplementing the production of natural-origin salmon in the Sacramento River watershed.  But would another large, production hatchery “reproduce” the natural spawn, or hasten its replacement?

After all, hatcheries in the Sacramento River watershed already produce and release millions of Sacramento fall-run Chinook. The Coleman National Fish Hatchery (Battle Creek) releases 12 million fall-run Chinook smolts annually. The Feather River Hatchery has an annual goal to release 6 million smolts, and the Nimbus Fish Hatchery (American River) another 4 million. Other Central Valley hatcheries not in the Sacramento River watershed also release fall-run Chinook. The goal of the Mokelumne River Fish Hatchery is to release 5 million smolts, with an additional 2 million released into San Pablo Bay or into acclimation pens in the ocean. The Feather River Hatchery also produces an additional 2 million fall-run Chinook to truck downstream for an ocean enhancement program. Before building another large hatchery, it seems fair to ask why releasing millions of hatchery fall-run Chinook – year after year – hasn’t already reproduced the natural spawn.

What if current hatchery practices are also exerting negative effects on Sacramento fall-run Chinook, like overfishing and unbalanced water management do? Yes, some California hatchery facilities are very old, but what if investing $100 million to bring them to state-of-the-art production levels makes at least some things worse?

Ditto for building “one hatchery, centrally located that handles everything…” We already know that very little population structure remains in the Sacramento fall-run Chinook; the variation or diversity that once existed has been greatly diminished from the time when they thrived not only in the Sacramento River, but also in large tributaries like the Feather, Yuba, and American rivers, and in numerous other smaller rivers and streams in the watershed. Large dams that eliminated nearly all the upstream natal habitat of the winter-run and spring-run Chinook are generally regarded as the primary cause of the demise of these stocks. But the dams did not eliminate nearly as much fall-run Chinook habitat because the fall-run do not migrate as far upstream to spawn. So, relative to habitat loss due to dams, did hatcheries play a larger role in the “homogenization” observed in the fall-run Chinook stock?

We know that salmon in streams do not select mates randomly, so the random mate selection in hatcheries effectively eliminates adult competition. We also know that captive rearing and feeding of juvenile salmon minimizes the mortality that would naturally occur in a river. Do juvenile salmon in hatchery ponds acquire food or avoid predators the same as fish in the wild? It also makes sense that wild juveniles migrating hundreds of miles in a river must adapt to more perilous environments than do hatchery fish transported in trucks. Are the consequences of these hatchery effects the losses of vigor, the ability to adapt to local environments and variation, and evolutionary fitness?

It seems we could better understand hatchery effects by spending some of the $100 million on modern salmon monitoring. Genetics-based tools already exist, so that all hatchery broodstock can be tissue-sampled and genotyped, with the information stored in a computer database. All hatchery offspring (millions of fish) would be effectively “tagged” and their hatchery of origin could be identified later, if they are genotyped when captured — in the fishery, after straying to the natural spawning grounds, when interbreeding with wild fish, etc. Similarly, tissues from salmon carcasses on the natural spawning grounds could be collected and genotyped (they are already surveyed every year by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife). This process would genetically “tag” the natural-born offspring in the Sacramento River and its tributaries.

These tools would allow biologists and managers to know the origin of a salmon. They could also better understand the effects of artificial propagation, such as interbreeding, on natural-origin fish. We could begin to understand if hatcheries could “re-colonize and re-populate the Sacramento River with hatchery fish” and “get them to spawn in the rivers and start reproducing the natural spawn.”

An alternative to building and ramping up another large production hatchery might be  to try (mobile) conservation hatchery set-ups, to temporarily supplement wild stocks in the Sacramento River and tributaries. With genetic tagging, we could know how well the offspring survive to return and spawn, and how successful their offspring are at surviving and reproducing. We could detect if and when the rivers get healthier, and begin producing more eggs and adult salmon than the hatcheries do. We might get to a place where there is no need to clip adipose fins.

Let’s start working together to recover salmon!

Butte Creek Salmon – 2022 Update Guest Post by Allen Harthorn, Executive Director, Friends of Butte Creek

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The 2018 run of spawning adult spring-run Chinook salmon in Butte Creek was not abundant by Butte Creek standards.  These were the offspring of the 2015 drought-year run.  California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) estimated only around 2000 spawning adults in 2018, in the lower 25% percentile of the population counts since 1995. The first egg laying in 2018 happened in late September, and the last of the spawners finished their dance around the middle of October. Carcasses were counted, the wildlife of the creek had been feasting for weeks.

The wait began for the eggs in the gravel to “eye up,” a point where the eggs are known to have been successfully fertilized. Several weeks later, depending on water temperature, the alevin juveniles “button up”, or finish feeding off their yolk sack and started feeding on their own as fry. Fry juveniles were captured by CDFW in November, some early in November. This is fairly rapid salmon development for spring-run salmon, but Butte Creek, where the fish spawn, is one of the warmest stream reaches supporting spring-run Chinook.

Early on November 8th of 2018, a black cloud rose rapidly over Butte Creek. The Camp Fire began at 6:30 in the morning. It raced across two ridges and the 3-mile-wide West Branch Feather River canyon, and exploded across Paradise and Magalia and down Little Butte Creek Canyon like a torch. Another section burst off the ridge above Centerville and Helltown. By the next morning, 80% of the canyon downstream of Helltown had burned. Hundreds of homes were leveled. The fire meandered through the canyon for two weeks.

As storms began to approach California, a massive effort to try and control the potentially toxic runoff and pollution was initiated by Friends of Butte Creek and the US Fish and Wildlife Service. They placed many miles of straw erosion control wattles around most all of the burned-out structures. When the heavy rains began, it seemed like there was nothing more that could be done to save the emerging salmon. The creek ran black with ash, soil, and debris. Monitoring on Little Butte Creek, which drains much of Paradise, showed high levels of many toxic chemicals, including arsenic. Although the salmon seemed insignificant in light of the destruction from the fire, biologists were worried that there would little success from this small 2018 run.

Early in March of 2021, an amazing sight began surging through the Butte Creek system. Despite a seriously dry winter and relatively low flow in the creek, salmon started showing up in great numbers. Schools of 10-50 fish were sighted throughout the system. By late March, many thousands of spring-run salmon were making their way into the middle canyon reach below Centerville where cool, deep pools provide the most important refuge for these fish to make it through the summer. In April, at one of the monitoring pools with the easiest access, nearly 800 fish held in one pool.

Downstream, water diversion dams in the valley sections of Butte Creek were in pretty good shape after many years of upgrades to the ladders and screens, allowing salmon to reach the upstream holding pools earlier and in better condition than years past. Late arrivals in the past often showed damage to their skin from concrete dams and ladders, and had low spawning success rates.  Fungus often covered the eyes of these late-arriving fish, and many did not make it through the summer.

Figure 1. Weir 1, May 2012. CDFW Photo.

Figure 1. Weir 1, May 2012. CDFW Photo.

In April 2021, a number of early-arriving fish uncharacteristically showed up with serious damage to their heads. Not much later, word began to spread that water had been shut off at one of the weirs in the Sutter Bypass, and many spring-run salmon had perished. Apparently, some salmon that did make it past the dam suffered injuries in the process. Additionally, the low flow in the Sutter Bypass may have led hundreds of Butte Creek salmon to continue on up the Sacramento River to Colusa where Butte Creek originally entered the river at the Butte Slough Outfall gates. The gates were closed, but the fish sensed this was a potential access to Butte Creek and began bashing their heads and bodies on the outfall gates. It took many days for the Department of Water Resources to open the gates for fish, and many damaged salmon surged into the creek. At times in late April and early May, as many as 10% of the fish showed signs of damage.

Most significant was the size of the run that looked to be the biggest run of spring-run Chinook salmon to ever return to Butte Creek, all from the parent spawning population of about 2000 fish.

California Department of Fish and Wildlife biologists began doing snorkel surveys in June and quickly began estimating over 10,000 adult returnees. Local observers, including this author, estimated over 20,000, rivaling the 20,000 estimated returnees of 1998. The sight was spectacular, and optimism was high that something about the Camp Fire may have contributed to the success of the juveniles from that fateful fall in 2018, along with the wet winter in 2019.  Successful salmon populations may benefit from nutrient releases, sediment and ash cover for their downstream migration, or for other unknown elements of the cycle.  The extra nutrients, and the high flows and water levels in the Butte Basin and Sutter Bypass in winter 2019, were likely beneficial.

The downside of this huge run of fish became apparent in summer 2021. High air temperatures in mid-June pushed the thermometer over 100 degrees F. for several days, and water temperatures in Butte Creek soared. Meanwhile, operations of the imported West Branch Feather River water for PG&E’s DeSabla powerhouse hit a snag when one shallow (and warm) West Branch reservoir (Round Valley Reservoir) ran out of water earlier than expected. This led to a drop in flow that affected Butte Creek for about 24 hours (Figure 2 below). Colder water was released from another West Branch reservoir (Philbrook) a day later and quickly moderated temperature in the creek, but the brief drop in flow came about the same time as the start of the disease outbreak among the holding salmon in Butte Creek. Water temperatures began to rise above 19.8 degrees Celsius soon after the flow drop on June 23 (Figure 3 below). Dead fish afflicted with Ich and Columnaris began turning up in the pre-spawn mortality survey just a week later. Another two weeks later, hundreds of dead fish began rotting in Butte Creek or were dragged off by opportunistic wildlife. By the end of July, when surveys were interrupted by smoky conditions from the Dixie Fire, almost 14,000 pre-spawn mortalities had been counted.

Figure 2. Water import from West Branch Feather River to Butte Creek, June 22-27, 2021.
Source: California Data Exchange Center

Figure 3: Recorded mean water temperature (ºC) within the 3 holding pool locations along with numbers of pre-spawn moralities recorded throughout the pre-spawn mortality survey.
Source: CDFW Butte Creek Spring-Run Chinook Salmon Adult Monitoring Report 2021

Butte Creek is the most productive salmon stream in California and is the home of what is far and away the state’s most important spring-run Chinook population. However, following a year with good production, good juvenile rearing conditions, good ocean conditions, but nearly 92% pre-spawn mortality, one has to wonder if the management and operations of Butte Creek in Butte Creek Canyon under the current configuration of infrastructure are ever going to be able to provide reliable conditions for spring-run salmon to thrive. Although 2021 was the hottest summer on record in California, new records seem to be set almost every year. The Quartz Bowl (Figure 4 below), where most of the 1807 spring-run that survived in 2021 managed to stay alive, is no longer the refuge it has been in the past.

Figure 4. Quartz Bowl Pool, August 2021. Photo by John Sherman.

The salmon spawning reaches of Butte Creek, upstream of the old Covered Bridge near the intersection of Honey Run Road and Centerville Road in Butte Creek Canyon, are largely managed under PG&E’s DeSabla-Centerville Hydroelectric Project, FERC Project No. 803. The Project notably features diversion of water from Butte Creek into the Butte Canal and diversion of water from the West Branch Feather River into the Hendricks Canal and the Toadtown Canal. At the bottom of these canals is DeSabla Forebay (Figure 6 below), a ~200- acre-foot reservoir located next to Skyway (road) on the ridge uphill from the town of Paradise. Water collected in DeSabla Forebay is dropped through a “penstock” (pressurized pipe) into DeSabla Powerhouse, from which it is discharged into Butte Creek. DeSabla Powerhouse is located right next to Butte Creek, about two miles upstream of the Quartz Bowl Pool, the current upstream limit for Butte Creek’s spring-run salmon.

The DeSabla-Centerville Hydroelectric Project’s import of water from the West Branch Feather River helps provide additional cool water for spring-run salmon holding in Butte Creek when managed properly. Maintaining this import of water in some form is essential to the long-term viability of spring-run salmon in Butte Creek.

Historically, PG&E also diverted water at Centerville Head Dam, less than a mile downstream of DeSabla Powerhouse, into Lower Centerville Canal, where water flowed about 6 miles downstream to pass through Centerville Powerhouse, whose outfall re-entered Butte Creek near the community of Centerville. Centerville Powerhouse has been inoperable since 2011, and PG&E has not diverted water into Lower Centerville Canal since 2013.

Figure 5. Map of the DeSabla-Centerville Project and area, from February 2017 PG&E flyer distributed simultaneous to PG&E’s request to FERC to withdraw its application for a new project license.

In October 2004, PG&E began the process of seeking a new hydropower license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for the DeSabla-Centerville Project. The relicensing was largely complete with the State Water Board’s issuance of a final water quality certification for the relicensing, revised  in 2016. A biological opinion from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for protection of Butte Creek’s spring-run salmon and steelhead under the Endangered Species Act was the last major remaining step before FERC’s issuance of a new hydropower license.

However, in February 2017, PG&E withdrew its application for a new license, announcing its intention to sell the project. FERC disallowed the withdrawal, but held the licensing process in abeyance pending potential sale.

Five and a half years later, on August 16, 2022, PG&E informed FERC that negotiations to sell the project had ended without sale, and PG&E requested that FERC complete the relicensing process. In the interim, none of the conditions that FERC and the State Water Board were poised to require of PG&E in the new project license have been implemented. Most notable among measures not yet implemented is a device to reduce heating of water as it is held in and passes through DeSabla Forebay. NMFS called out the need for such an infrastructure improvement in a Preliminary Biological Opinion in 2006.

Figure 6. DeSabla Forebay and intake tower to DeSabla Powerhouse. The reservoir is almost totally unshaded; ambient summer temperatures are frequently in the 90’s and above. Photo by C. Shutes.

The mass pre-spawn mortality in 2021 put an enormous exclamation point on the urgency of completing upgrades in the DeSabla hydroelectric project. It should also cause fisheries managers and advocates to revisit decisions about whether a large-scale reconfiguration of infrastructure is needed to keep water imported from the West Branch cold enough to benefit spring-run salmon in Butte Creek. Admittedly expensive options like piping all or part of the Hendricks and Toadtown canals, or bypassing them with a tunnel, may be required. Outside funding may also be required.

Perhaps the best and most durable solution, and one that is being tested elsewhere, is to get the fish upstream to colder water. Three separate studies completed in 1997, 1998, and 2000 by Holtgrieve (CSU Chico), Kier Institute for Fisheries Resources, and Watanabe (CDFG) indicated that there is good habitat upstream, and all recommended further study.

There are problems with fish passage to the upper reaches of Butte Creek. These include natural barriers, such as that at Quartz Bowl, about which fisheries managers have traditionally been squeamish (a notable exception is a recently completed fish ladder past a natural barrier on Deer Creek), and also the no-longer-used Centerville Head Dam (Figure 7 below), which has no fish ladder.

There are also problems with diversion of water out of Butte Creek by the DeSabla Project (into the Butte Canal) and by the nearby Forks of Butte Project, the latter recently offered for sale.

In the past, fisheries managers concluded that the difficulties and costs of fish passage and major new infrastructure outweighed the potential benefits. But given the reality of climate change, increasing temperatures, and greater frequency of drier dry years, it is high time to revisit the tradeoffs. Large-scale improvements may provide value that is well worth the costs to save the extraordinary run of spring-run salmon in Butte Creek.

Figure 7. Centerville Head Dam. Photo by Allen Harthorn.

Figure 8: Butte Creek annual escapement and pre-spawn mortalities, 1956-2021. Figure created by Friends of Butte Creek.

 

Allen Harthorn

Executive Director

Friends of Butte Creek

Lake Shasta and Sacramento River Operations: Lessons Learned – #1, Part 2

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Following an introductory post, this is the second post in a series on the lessons learned by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) from the 2013-2015 drought that devastated Sacramento River salmon populations.  The first post addressed Lesson #1 and its non-application in the first half of 2020. 

This post addresses how the non-application of Lesson #1 in 2020 evolved into a tug-of-war in the second half of 2020 and has cascaded into non-action so far in 2021. For more detail and links, see CSPA’s March 15, 2021 letter to the State Water Board urging immediate action to protect Sacramento River and Delta fisheries in 2021.  See also the State Water Board’s Sacramento River Temperature web page, though some of the links are not live, at: https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/sacramento_river/index.html

Water and fisheries managers have known for many years that both the Lake Shasta storage level on April 1 and spring releases from Shasta determine how much cold water will be available in the lower Sacramento River through the summer.  However, in 2020, as discussed in Part 1 of this series, the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) refused to decide on water temperature management options for Shasta Reservoir and the lower Sacramento River before April 1.  Reclamation submitted a draft temperature management plan (TMP) to the State Water Board on April 23 and a final TMP on May 20, neither of which evaluated reduced delivery options whose analysis the State Water Board had requested.

Meanwhile, Reclamation was operating in 2020 in the first year of the new Trump-era Biological Opinions for the long-term operation of the Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP).1 The stated purpose of these Opinions was to “maximize deliveries” of water to contractors, and did they ever deliver.  See part of the results in Figure 4 of the previous post: very high deliveries to Sacramento River CVP contractors in April and May, so that water in Lake Shasta was committed before the plan to operate Shasta was complete.

By June 1, 2020, the State Water Board had rejected Reclamation’s TMP.  In its June 1, 2020 letter refusing Reclamation’s May 20 TMP, the State Water Board wrote:

Reclamation has declined to evaluate additional operational scenarios. Reclamation’s position is that scenarios with different operational assumptions would be inconsistent with its contractual obligations, and are therefore beyond Reclamation’s reasonable control. The State Water Board disagrees. To the extent that Reclamation delivers water under its own water rights, Reclamation’s obligation to deliver water to its contractors does not take precedence over its permit obligations.

On July 17, 2020, CSPA and its partners reached a settlement agreement with the State Water Board that dealt in substantial part with Sacramento River temperature management.  The settlement agreement requires the State Board to conduct a transparent Sacramento River Temperature Management process.  The process must address all controllable factors, including deliveries, and ensure adequate staffing, modeling and public review.  The CSPA settlement became part of the dispute between Reclamation and the State Water Board in the following months.

After exchanges of letters between Reclamation and the State Water Board in June and July, and an addendum to the TMP on July 31, the State Water Board gave up on 2020 and in an August 4 letter  tentatively approved the TMP, subject to conditions, two of which stated:

  • Reclamation shall develop a draft protocol by September 30, 2020, that meets the criteria identified by the State Water Board;
  • By September 15, 2020, Reclamation shall provide additional information concerning fall operations, including the volume and timing of releases and deliveries each month through December.

On August 31, the State Water Board sent a follow-up letter clarifying its request of Reclamation:

As part of the State Water Board’s conditional approval of Reclamation’s 2020 Temperature Management Plan (TMP), Reclamation is required to develop an initial draft protocol by September 30, 2020. The State Water Board will hold a public workshop this fall in coordination with Reclamation to receive public comment on the initial draft protocol to inform its completion. Once public comments are received, the Board intends to work with Reclamation to refine and finalize the protocol before the beginning of the next temperature planning and water supply allocation season in February 2021. The Board has requested that the protocol include the elements specified in the settlement agreement with the California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, et al., which the Board recently forwarded to Reclamation. This letter provides additional detail regarding issues that should be addressed as part of the protocol.

None of it happened.  No protocol.  No public workshop.  No public comments.  No disclosure to the State Water Board of the timing and releases of release and deliveries from September through December.  No final protocol by February 2021.  Instead, one final letter from Reclamation on September 30, deflecting the issue to the settlement with CSPA even though the issues in the settlement were issues raised by the State Water Board months before the settlement was completed: “Reclamation does not consider a state court voluntary settlement, to which Reclamation is not a party, as valid, enforceable legal requirements imposed on Reclamation.”

After all the correspondence, Reclamation affirmed on September 30 that it was right the first time: “The process for analyzing conditions and incorporating the best information into water management decisions for temperature management at Shasta Reservoir is outlined in the Shasta Cold Water Pool Management Flow Guidance document which was shared with the State Board staff on April 2, 2020.”

And so it comes full circle.  Faced with adversity last fall, the State Water to date performed as it all too often has: it has done nothing.  The Ides of March have passed, and there is every sign that the State Water Board will for a second straight year allow Reclamation to once again defy Lesson #1: Keswick releases need to be decided by April 15.

No Delta Smelt Fall 2018

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Though I hate to “beat a dead horse” or perhaps more appropriately “put another nail in the coffin,” I’m sad to report that the California Department of Fish and Wildlife’s first two fall trawl surveys for 2018 collected no Delta Smelt. This is consistent with this past summer’s townet survey results. Let’s get on with implementing the smelt hatchery program.

Fall mid-water trawl survey catch for September and October 2008-2018. Data source: http://www.dfg.ca.gov/delta/data/fmwt/indices.asp

PG&E Withdraws License Application on Butte Creek: Future of Spring-Run Salmon Uncertain

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By Chris Shutes (CSPA) and Dave Steindorf (American Whitewater)

In a surprise move, PG&E announced on February 2, 2017 that it was withdrawing its application to relicense the DeSabla – Centerville Hydroelectric Project on Butte Creek and the West Branch Feather River.  The reach of Butte Creek affected by the Project is home to the only remaining viable population of spring-run Chinook salmon in California’s Central Valley.

Spring-run salmon in Butte Creek have seen a resurgence over the last twenty years.  A substantial part of this was due to investments and improvements downstream of the Project. In addition, since 2003, PG&E and state and federal resource agencies have greatly improved the management of the Project for the fish.

From 2004 to 2009, PG&E went through a formal relicensing process with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to relicense the Project.  In 2016, the State Water Board issued a Water Quality Certification needed for a new license.  A new license from FERC was widely expected in 2017.

In a DeSabla – Centerville fact sheet and map that PG&E distributed with its announcement, PG&E describes the project as follows:

The Project diverts a portion of the natural flow of water from Butte Creek and West Branch of the Feather River (WBFR) into canals that carry the water for use in hydroelectric powerhouses. Once water is run through the powerhouses it is ultimately released to Butte Creek. During the summer, the natural flow of the WBFR is augmented by water releases from Round Valley and Philbrook reservoirs. Project diversions have provided additional flow to Butte Creek for more than 100 years. One of the beneficiaries of this additional flow has been the aquatic community in Butte Creek, including Central Valley spring-run Chinook salmon.

While it is true that water from the Project augmented flows below Centerville Powerhouse for 100 years, it is only since 1980 that the Project benefited fish in the eight miles of Butte Creek between DeSabla Powerhouse and Centerville (see map).  The 2016 Water Quality Certification requires all the Butte Creek water and the imported water to remain in Butte Creek once it exits DeSabla Powerhouse.

The DeSabla – Centerville Project facilities are built around infrastructure that dates to 1900 and in some cases before.  Commissioned in 1900, Centerville Powerhouse has been offline since 2011, and ran only partially for the five years previous to that.  To function at all, it would need a complete rebuild.  The estimated cost to rebuild was $39 Million in the mid-1990’s; it is almost certainly now double that, or more.  DeSabla Powerhouse, nine miles upstream of Centerville, is relatively modern and in good condition, but the small reservoir that feeds it allows water to heat up too much passing through.

In California’s modern energy market, the capability to regulate the grid gives hydropower its greatest value.  But unlike many other hydropower projects, powerhouses in the DeSabla – Centerville Project run at a constant rate, day and night, regardless of when power demand is high or low.  They also have no ability to help regulate the power grid, especially to respond to short-term changes in supply from intermittent renewable sources like wind and solar.

The real value of the Project is the water it imports from the West Branch Feather River to Butte Creek: value for the fish and value for the farms that use the water further downstream.  The fish can’t pay for this service; the farms have never been asked to pay and never have.

PG&E’s decision not to relicense the Project does not lead to a path that is simple.  In the next few months, moving into the next few years, PG&E will need to establish a stakeholder engagement process to help determine the Project’s long-term disposition.  PG&E will need to engage resource agencies, downstream water rights holders, interested NGO’s, and local residents.  The DeSabla – Centerville Project has been part of the community for over a century.  Its resource values are enormous.  The water that it supplies downstream is essential to the irrigation of thousands of acres of crops.

On September 19, 2015, PG&E bought an advertisement on the editorial page of the San Francisco Chronicle entitled:  “Of Bees, Birds and Chillin’ Chinook: All in a Sustainable Day at PG&E.”  Mr. Tony Earley, CEO of PG&E at the time, started the ad by extolling PG&E’s work to keep salmon in Butte Creek cool.  His major theme stated: “The days are long past when energy companies could afford to think of their mission as separate from conservation, sustainability and good management of our natural resources.  Our view must be for the long term.  That’s why we live our commitment to conservation through a number of programs.”

We look forward to the opportunity to help PG&E maintain this well-stated goal.