Welcome to the California Fisheries Blog

The California Sportfishing Protection Alliance is pleased to host the California Fisheries Blog. The focus will be on pelagic and anadromous fisheries. We will also cover environmental topics related to fisheries such as water supply, water quality, hatcheries, harvest, and habitats. Geographical coverage will be from the ocean to headwaters, including watersheds, streams, rivers, lakes, bays, ocean, and estuaries. Please note that posts on the blog represent the work and opinions of their authors, and do not necessarily reflect CSPA positions or policy.

Another Fall-Run Salmon Crash – Bad Ocean Conditions Again? Or Bad River/Delta/Bay Conditions?

NOAA Fisheries’ Northwest Fisheries Science Center states on its website1: “Similar to 2015, many of the ocean ecosystem indicators suggest 2016 to be another poor year for juvenile salmon survival, the second consecutive year of poor ocean conditions. The PDO2 was strongly positive (warm) throughout 2016, coinciding with the continuing of the anomalously warm ocean conditions in the NE Pacific initiated by the “The Blob” that began in the fall of 2013. Strong El Niño conditions at the equator also persisted throughout 2015 until May of 2016. Sea surface and upper 20 m water temperatures off Newport Oregon remained warmer than usual (+2°C) throughout most of 2016 continuing two consecutive years of anomalously warm ocean conditions.” See Figures below and at end for more details from NMFS presentation.

Mother Nature has once again dealt California salmon a deadly set of circumstances. There is not much that can be done at this point, because much of this bad hand has already been played during the 2012-2016 drought and the bad ocean conditions in 2015 and 2016. Reduction of the 2017 sport and commercial fisheries has been prescribed again to save the patient. Cutting salmon harvest is like applying a tourniquet to an amputation, yet it is necessary. Have we not learned to better prepare for such circumstances?

Once again, the blame for poor resource management is being shifted to poor ocean conditions. Evidence clearly indicates that poor inland river, Delta, and Bay conditions were also a major factor in the poor survival of salmon during the recent drought. Furthermore, evidence indicates that the fall-run hatchery salmon populations that make up most of the commercial and sport fishing catch were sustained through the drought by the transport of hatchery smolts to the Bay avoiding the poor river and Bay-Delta conditions. There was very poor survival of smolts released near upriver hatcheries during the drought compared to smolts trucked to the Delta or the Bay. This is strong evidence that the rivers and Delta are the key factors in Central Valley salmon viability.3

The same circumstances occurred in the 2004-2008 period, leading to the 2008 “salmon crash”. First came a sequence of drier years, 2001-2005; two bad ocean years, 2004 and 2005; then a flood year 2006; followed by drought years 2007 and 2008. The salmon populations did recover with better runs in 2012 and 2013 because of normal-wet river conditions in 2010-2012 and good ocean condition in 2010-2013, but the runs have since declined sharply, beginning in 2014 and culminating in the expected 2017 crash. So far, the 2017 fishery is better than expected because of the expanded hatchery transport efforts in 2014. The prognosis is not as good for the wild salmon that were not trucked to the Bay.

Declining runs in the drought years 2014 and 2015, poor young production from 2013-2015, and the poor run of two-year-old (jacks) from brood-year 2014 in 2016 are indicators of a population crash. The brood-year 2014 jacks were the consequence of cumulative bad conditions: (1) in their spawning run (summer-fall 2014), (2) during incubation and first year rearing-emigration (winter-spring 2015), (3) during their first two summers in the ocean (2015-2016), and (4) poor conditions during their run from the ocean in summer-fall 2016 from the drought hangover. Three-year-olds from the 2014 brood year are also expected to return in poor numbers in 2017, because of droughts during their parents’ spawn, poor river rearing conditions (2015), and then poor ocean conditions in 2015 and 2016.

The prognosis for brood-years 2015-2017 (2018-2020 runs) is not good for some of the same reasons, especially the expected poor numbers of spawners. These runs will carry hangovers from poor river and ocean conditions in 2015 and 2016.

One thing is lessening the overall effect on fisheries: trucking hatchery smolts to the Bay. While that is not helping the wild salmon populations in the Central Valley, or those hatchery populations not included in the trucking program, it is helping.

What can be done to improve all the salmon populations in the Central Valley?

  1. Reduce harvest of adults in ocean and rivers (being implemented).
  2. Increase hatchery production (take more eggs and rear more smolts).
  3. Diversify hatchery smolt production by rearing some fry in natural floodplain habitats.
  4. Increase hatchery smolt survival by trucking and barging to the Bay and pen acclimating in the Bay.
  5. Improve migration and pre-spawn holding conditions for wild and hatchery adult spawners by maintaining spring-fall migration conditions (flow and water temperatures) in lower rivers and spawning reaches.
  6. Maintain adequate water levels and water temperatures to sustain eggs and embryos until hatching and emergence.
  7. Provide optimum flows and water temperatures in rearing areas for growth and survival (minimize predation).
  8. Provide flow pulses to attract spawners to spawning rivers below major rim dams.
  9. Provide winter and spring flow pulses to stimulate juvenile emigration and to provide floodplain rearing opportunities.
  10. Limit South Delta exports during late fall to spring peak emigration periods.

With so many factors potentially affecting salmon survival and production, it is hard to say which of these prescriptions will be most effective. We should focus on doing them all, at least in this plentiful water year (2017).

Ocean condition indicators 1999-2016. Source: see footnote 1.
Red = poor conditions. Green = good conditions. Yellow = intermediate conditions.

The Twin-Tunnels Project: A Disaster for Salmon Part 3 of a Series

The Myth of the Salmon “Motels”

As previously discussed in Parts 1 and 2 of this series, due to the poor intake locations of the Twin Tunnels, the unacceptably low sweeping flows past the intakes’ fish screens, and exceedingly and harmfully long exposure time of young salmon to the screens, the fish will encounter a formidable gauntlet while attempting to migrate to the ocean. The Twin-Tunnels project proponents begrudgingly realized that the daunting length of the three fish screens will likely result in salmon impingement and other problems. Their solution? Slap on yet another unproven measure to supposedly provide temporary “refuge” for the weakened fish traversing the long screens. As stated in the 2016 WaterFix Final EIR/EIS1:

“Because of the length of the screens and extended fish exposure to their influence (screens and cleaners), fish refugia areas have been recommended to be incorporated into the screen design of the intakes (FFTT 2011). These areas would consist of small areas created within the columns between the fish screens that will provide small fish resting areas and protected cover from predators. Design concepts for fish refugia are still in their infancy and are usually site-specific, with designs recommended by the fish agencies (Svoboda 2013).”

Essentially, they have recommended embedding miniature, shallow cages (Figure 1) in concrete columns placed between the screens, trusting that as the salmon inevitably become exhausted and by some means avoid being squished by the screen wiper blades (referred to as “cleaners” in the statement above), the fish will somehow enter the small cages and avoid mortal injury.

Figure 1. Example of a so-called “refuge” for juvenile salmon envisioned for the Twin Tunnels’ intakes. This particular structure (dewatered during construction) was installed at a fish screen in Red Bluff, CA and, to this author’s knowledge, has never been tested. Photo is from Svoboda 2013.

Envision a weary human traveler driving from New York to L.A. Eventually, the traveler checks into a motel to rest and emerge the next morning with renewed energy to continue the arduous journey to his/her final destination. Such is the basic concept for salmon at the Twin Tunnels’ intakes. Essentially, the Twin Tunnels’ proponents have suggested providing “motels” in the WaterFix intakes to theoretically provide a respite for the fatigued salmon on their downstream voyage. To continue surviving this gauntlet, once the small fish supposedly enter a motel, the fish ultimately have to leave and continue along the screens until, in theory, another motel is fortuitously encountered. Of course and unfortunately, if salmon enter these motels, so can massive amounts of riverine debris; the resulting limited space, if any, will have to be shared. Many of these highly experimental motels are proposed for each of the three huge fish screens.

This salmon motel design has never been actually tested in a river and, based on my experience from countless hours of underwater observations of young salmon, has an extremely high probability of failure. I believe this was sort of a “Hail-Mary” attempt to avoid serious scrutiny of likely fish impingement and other problems. This concept was loosely founded on significant discoveries I made when conducting underwater inspections of a fish screen on the Sacramento River and found large numbers of young salmon residing in a very large, deep and wide chamber between trash racks and the screen (see: Salmon Discovery 1 and Salmon Discovery 2). Based on those findings, I offered a different promising bioengineering alternative for the proposed WaterFix fish screens; it was ignored.

Next in the Series: Ring the Dinner Bell!

  1. Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact Statement

MWD’s Dreams: a Nightmare for Fish

The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, commonly known as MWD, recently released a series of information papers on the California WaterFix (Delta Tunnels). In this first in a series of posts I address MWD’s “assessment” of what will happen to the Bay-Delta environment and fish community if the WaterFix is built and operated.

One figure from MWD’s papers demonstrates the primary flaw in its assessment.

This key figure from the MWD’s papers accurately portrays the WaterFix’s potential “benefit.” But it leaves out the back story. The “uncontrolled” winter flows from Mother Nature’s few-and-far-between miracle rain events in drought years like 2013, as portrayed in the figure, were long ago allocated to the Bay-Delta as a small compensation for all the water taken from potential Bay inflow not shown in the chart.1 The proposed new WaterFix exports shown by the white line would take a good-sized bite out of what was left for the Bay. The proposed Sites Reservoir would take another large bite.

What is not shown is that this increase in export water would come from un-dammed tributaries to the Sacramento River such as Cow, Cottonwood, Battle, Deer, and Mill creeks, and the partially dammed Yuba and Cosumnes rivers. Most of the total inflow to the Valley from the storms shown on this graph was captured and stored in the large reservoirs on the main rivers (Sacramento, San Joaquin, Feather, American, Mokelumne, Stanislaus, Tuolumne, Merced, and Trinity), before it ever got to the Delta. Diversions to storage and exports from the Valley captured over 20 million acre-ft in Water Year 2013, including carryover storage.

It is true that exports from the south Delta were only about 2 million acre-ft for water year 2013: export water rights are among the last in line, especially in very dry years. About 2 million acre-ft, roughly the same amount of water as exports, flowed to the Bay from the uncontrolled winter flow. The other Delta outflow for the year was water that was released from storage to repel salinity and thus keep water for exports and Delta farming fresh enough to use.

The caption at bottom left of the figure attributes the loss of 800,000 acre-ft to biological opinions for fish, and suggests that WaterFix would “recover” these “losses.” The “loss” is not real and “recovery” of this water would only be possible at the further expense of fisheries already in collapse. The present (and past) restrictions on exports are needed to protect (1) the tens of millions of young hatchery and wild salmon and steelhead moving from rivers to the Bay-Delta and ocean during the flow pulses, and (2) the spawning runs of Delta and longfin smelt, which are also keyed to the flow pulses. Screening the WaterFix intakes is not going to protect the flow needs of the fish that depend wholly on the storm flows moving through the Delta to the Bay and ocean.

  1. Past water rights and water quality control plans, as well as various water project operating agreements, recognized the important role played by uncontrolled Delta inflows and outflows. Qualifiers to such agreements commonly stated that further allocation or access to these uncontrolled would not be made without careful review of the environmental consequences.

The Twin-Tunnels Project: A Disaster for Salmon – Part 2 of a Series

Another biological problem with the Twin-Tunnels’ intakes:  Like gigantic vacuum cleaners, the flow pulled through the river intakes will likely suck baby salmon up against the fish screens (called “impingement”).  To minimize this problem, low through-screen water velocities (also called approach velocities) are necessary to hopefully prevent young salmon from encountering physical, injurious contact with fish screens.  The WaterFix proponents “promise” to keep those velocities low.  The biological problem with this premise is that juvenile salmon are weak swimmers on a sustained basis and cannot tolerate swimming against approach velocities through the screens for long periods.  When naturally migrating downstream, the small fish essentially “go with the flow” and do not aggressively fight against the current, except in unavoidable desperation (see: Struggling Salmon).  To avoid impingement, the salmon suddenly have to fight against the flow entering the WaterFix intakes.  The small salmon can only combat the currents for short periods until fatigue sets in and eventually succumb to the water flowing into the screens.

In the not-so-distant past, to minimize this fish impingement problem, a federal criterion mandated that young salmon should not be exposed to fish screens for more than 60 seconds, even with low approach velocities.  The biological concept is to move salmon very quickly past the screens before the fish surrender to the through-screen velocities, come into contact with the screens, and eventually die from abrasions and physical injury.  With large, long screens, this poses a very serious predicament.  In case of the Twin-Tunnels’ screens, it will not be possible to get the salmon away from the screens in less than a minute because of the large surface area and great length necessary to keep the through-screen velocities low while simultaneously maintaining high water diversion rates.  The salmon can only escape if swept by the long screens extremely fast.  In this regard, the Twin-Tunnels’ fish screens will perform miserably.  Because of the poor locations of the intakes discussed in the first of this series, salmon will be exposed to the proposed screens for long periods because of severely low sweeping flows.  Analyses conducted for the project revealed that young salmon could be exposed to each of the three individual WaterFix screens for an astounding one-hour period (not a typo) … not exactly the original 60 seconds criterion mentioned above.

Additionally, it will not be possible to maintain uniform through-screen velocities along the entire length for each of the three screens.  Therefore, WaterFix proposes to install “flow-control baffles” directly behind the screens.  These would typify tall vertical Venetian blinds (Figure 1).  The WaterFix idea is that if too much flow (and therefore unacceptably high through-screen water velocities) occurs in a particular area (“hot spots”), the baffles would be pinched down to restrict flow entering that particular area of the screens.  The problem, in reality, is this proposed engineering solution will be like chasing ghosts.  As river flows and diversions change dramatically, the through-screen velocities and complex secondary currents will also change significantly over the entire area of the fish screens.  Tweak the baffles upstream, then it’s time to adjust the baffles downstream, and so on.  Once done, everything changes hydraulically and you have to start all over again … a never-ending battle of futile attempts to achieve the fairytale of flow uniformity over the entire screen face under all river and water diversion conditions.  Whew!  I would not want to be the poor workers chasing back and forth over the combined ¾ of a mile of fish screens constantly tweaking baffles 24 hours a day, 7 days a week when water is being diverted into the Twin Tunnels.

Figure 1. Picture of flow-control baffles in the open position (foreground) and flat-plate screens in the background. Entire structure dewatered during construction. Picture by Dave Vogel.

Unlike agricultural diversions in upstream areas that primarily divert water during the spring, summer, and fall, the Twin-Tunnels’ intakes will be diverting water over the winter season under high-flow conditions.  Unfortunately, this will undoubtedly cause unavoidable massive debris loading on the screens.  In attempts to deal with the plugged screen openings caused by debris, enormous vertical “wiper blades” will be in continuous operation going back and forth against the screen surfaces.  Envision giant tooth brushes constantly scrubbing in a futile attempt to stop the persistent “plaque” build-up (Figure 2).  Some existing smaller flat-plate screens used in upstream areas (where debris loading is far less and sweeping flows are very high) have successfully employed such wiper blades, but those situations are far different than envisioned with the proposed Twin-Tunnels’ intakes during the winter.  The Twin-Tunnels’ unfortunate reality is that with the poor sweeping flows, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get rid of the debris.  And where will it go?  The detritus will merely drift downstream and continue to plug the next screen panel, then the next, etc., etc.  The increased debris loading during high river flows is likely to be enormous1, overwhelming the wiper blades … WaterFix has not adequately addressed this dilemma.  And … for those hapless, fatigued young salmon struggling against or impinged on the screens when the robotic wiper blades bear down on the fish under the cover of darkness and muddy water? … Squish.

Figure 2. Picture of a flat-plate screen wiper blade. Entire structure dewatered during construction. Picture by Dave Vogel.

Next in the series:  The myth of the Twin-Tunnels’ salmon “motels”.

  1.  E.g, see pages 133 – 134 “Working Conditions in the Field” in Lufkin (ed.) (1990)

The Twin-Tunnels Project: A Disaster for Salmon Part 1 of a Series

The proposed “Twin-Tunnels Project” (aka “WaterFix”) would divert enormous quantities of water1 from the Sacramento River to the south Delta for export into the San Joaquin River basin and southern California. If the project is built as presently planned, it will likely be a disaster for salmon for reasons described in this series. Water entering the two gargantuan tunnels would be pulled through three colossal water intakes2 directly on the banks of the Sacramento River, a short distance downstream from the City of Sacramento. Except when the Yolo Bypass is flooding, all four runs3 of Chinook salmon in the entire watershed would be forced to migrate past these enormous diversions. Three extremely long flat-plate fish screens would be positioned in front of each huge water diversion intake (Figure 1). The size of these screen structures will be massive, greatly exceeding the size of existing fish protective facilities in California. The combined length of the three screens will extend nearly 3/4th of a mile! The concept has never been tested elsewhere, possess numerous harmful obstacles for fish, and will likely kill large numbers of salmon. There is a high probability the structures will be catastrophic for salmon and severely undermine progress for salmon restoration in upstream areas. This series provides some highlights into the scientific basis to support that premise.

Figure 1. Conceptual rendering of one of the three on-bank intake facilities on the Sacramento River for the Twin-Tunnels project (Figure 3-19a from the 2016 Final EIR/EIS).

Location, Location, Location

Just like the old adage with real estate, fish screens must be located in good locations. Based on my 35+ years experience in the evaluation and bio-engineering of fish screens, in terms of hydraulic, physical, and biological conditions for fish protection, the proposed water intakes for the Twin-Tunnels are sited in some of the worst locations. Over a period of years, the Twin-Tunnels proponents presented the state and federal fish agencies with multiple hypothetical intake locations. It is evident that the agency representatives had no choice but to play with the losing hand dealt to them and recommended only general criteria that were severely constrained by the intakes sites. All of the options put forth were crappy … really crappy… for fish protection. It is obvious to me that the sites ultimately designated for the Twin-Tunnels project were not chosen because those locations would provide good fish protection but, instead, viewed as more favorable (but still bad) among the worst locations made available.

Because of the bad locations, the Twin-Tunnels’ screens will not have good “sweeping” flows to get the salmon out of the danger zone at the screens. Modern-day fish screens possess several features to help overcome the sweeping flow predicament for the Twin-Tunnels project. Sweeping flow complications can be partially alleviated by locating the screens on the outside bends of the river channel. An existing example of large Sacramento River flat-plate screen location demonstrates how that measure has been successfully implemented (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Aerial photograph showing an existing Sacramento River flat-plate fish screen located on an outside river bend to maintain high sweeping velocities. Water velocities passing the screen typically range between 2 to 4 feet/second.

In sharp contrast to such a real-world example, the three WaterFix intakes would be positioned in only very slight (or “gentle”4) river bends or relatively straight sections of the river channel (e.g. Figure 3) and, in all cases, undesirable lower gradient reaches of the river. Additionally, the Twin-Tunnels diversion intakes will be located in areas subject to tidal influence, further exacerbating the problems of ensuring protective sweeping flows. When the tide comes in twice a day, sweeping flows are reduced to the detriment of salmon.

Figure 3. Aerial photograph showing the approximate location of the proposed WaterFix downstream-most intake (termed “North Delta Intake No. 5”).

In summary, the Twin-Tunnels’ diversion sites will not provide the near-screen sweeping velocities necessary to protect downstream-migrating salmon. The noteworthy point is that past experience has clearly demonstrated that maintaining high sweeping velocities in front of large riverine flat-plate fish screens requires at least one of following to take place:

  1. Alter river channel geometry and create channel constrictions to control the hydraulic conditions at the fish screens.
  2. Position the fish screens on the outside sharp (not “gentle”) bend of the river channel where high water velocities are naturally present (e.g., Figure 2).
  3. Angle the fish screen out into the river channel in a downstream direction or jut the entire structure out into the channel in deeper, swifter water to maintain sweeping flows.

Unfortunately, the Twin-Tunnels’ intakes do not possess any of those conditions — period. Even the recently-issued National Marine Fisheries Service’s Biological Opinion on the Twin-Tunnels Project admitted that there is “a high degree of uncertainty” if the fish screens can be built to meet fish protection criteria because of the immense nature of the proposed screens.

Next in the series: How to squish baby salmon on a fish screen.

  1. 9,000 cubic feet per second (cfs).
  2. 3,000 cfs each.
  3. Fall run, late-fall run, endangered winter-run, and threatened spring-run.
  4. Adjective used in the original Twin-Tunnels EIR/EIS documents