Category Archives: Chinook Salmon

Addendum to the State Drought Plan – August 31, 2021, Part 3: Reclamation’s Bad Plan Left Fish Agencies with September Hobson’s Choice

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Earlier this summer, the Bureau of Reclamation’s operations of Shasta Reservoir, under its Drought Plan jointly developed with the California Department of Water Resources (DWR), caused high water temperatures that delayed spawning of winter-run Chinook salmon to early summer (mid-June through mid-July).1 Winter-run salmon leave the redds after 2-3 months, which in 2021 will mean a mid-August through September peak emergence.

In their Addendum to the State Water Project and Central Valley Project Drought Contingency Plan issued August 31, 2021, Reclamation and DWR state how an increase in September releases responded to a request from fisheries agencies:

In the July Drought Plan update, Reclamation’s forecast for releases to the Sacramento River were 7,850 cfs in August, ramping down to a monthly average of 5,200 cfs in September, and then going back up to 7,550 cfs in October to move the transfer water referenced above. In late August, the fishery agencies reviewed updated data indicating that a flow of approximately 6,800 cfs was needed through early-October to protect several remaining winter-run Chinook salmon redds. As a result, Reclamation modified its previous plan and held releases at 6,800 starting August 26.

Not so fast. In 2021, as in 2014, Reclamation cast the die early in the year, releasing too much water that was too warm until late June (Figures 1 and 2). That was Reclamation’s call, not the choice of the fish agencies. The agencies know that in drought year 2014, Reclamation also maintained both high flow releases and high water temperatures early in the summer, and that therefore the winter-run salmon spawned late. The agencies also know that a drop the water level 2-3 feet at the beginning of September 2014 (Figures 1 and 2) proved catastrophic to eggs and alevin still in the redds. Such drops in water level, with most redds in 1-3 ft of water, cause dewatering, reduced inter-redd water flow, sedimentation within the redd, lower dissolved oxygen, higher redd water temperatures, early hatching, direct egg/embryo mortality, and restricted fry movement within and emergence from redds.

The planned drop in early September of 2-3 feet in water level, part of the original 2021 Drought Plan, was a bad part of bad plan from the get-go. In 2015, Reclamation at least tried to avoid the drop by keeping releases lower throughout the summer (Figures 1 and 2). The August Addendum insinuates that added loss of storage in September-October to maintain higher flow/stage was the result of fishery agency review, when the agencies never wanted nor originally approved the September drop in river flow. The steady flow/stages in 2015 (Figures 1 and 2) was the appropriate prescription.

Just as it was a happy circumstance for the Sacramento River Settlement Contractors that Reclamation delivered them too much water north of the Delta early in the year, it was a happy circumstance for Reclamation and the Settlement Contractors that their planned water transfers of about 200 thousand acre-feet (TAF) to buyers south of the Delta just happened to be ready to go just as the drop planned earlier in the summer was scheduled to happen. Transfer water in a market where prices are north of $1000/AF is the mother’s milk of the change in September Shasta operations (Figure 3).

The accelerated schedule of transfers from Shasta storage also reduces the opportunity for the State Water Board or its Executive Director to wake up and smell the receding predictions for the reservoir’s receding shoreline. The tables at the end of the August Addendum now predict end-of-November storage in Shasta to be an unprecedented 729 TAF, down from the July Addendum’s prediction of 849 TAF. The only numbers that have maintained relative consistency throughout the summer 2021 Sacramento River debacle are the levels of deliveries and transfers. That consistency has been matched and enabled by the silence of the Water Board.

In summary, the original 2021 Drought Plan did not address the real risk of redd stranding that proved devastating for the winter-run salmon spawn in summer 2014. The July-August 2021 stage drop was bad enough and should have been avoided, given that high water temperatures delayed the spawn of winter-run to late June. The fish agencies were cornered into choosing between a large September 1 stage drop in a bad original plan and the buy-now-but-pay-later option of maintaining higher flows through September. The additional drain on Shasta storage and Reclamation’s increasing inability to maintain cold water releases through October show the folly and poor design of the original Drought Plan.

This post is part 3 in a series on DWR and Reclamation’s August Addendum to the 2021 Drought Plan.

Figure 1. River stage below Keswick Dam June-October 2014, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 2. River stage at Bend Bridge, 60 miles below Keswick Dam June-October 2014, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 3: Reclamation’s Delta Exports August 15-September 15, 2021.

Addendum to the State Drought Plan — August 31, 2021, Part 1: the Art of the Euphemism

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The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) released a Central Valley Drought Contingency Plan Update on August 31, 2021, stating:: “Project operations are still tracking with the operations forecast included in the July Drought Plan addendum. August has been fairly typical, with operations primarily controlled by system-wide depletions and Delta salinity.”  This is like a dispatch from the captain of the Titanic saying: the ship was tracking course since the last report, and yes, it hit the iceberg.  As is fairly typical under such circumstances, it sunk, primarily due to the hole in the hull.

The “depletions” that caused the current gaping hole in Shasta Reservoir’s storage and the resulting lethal downstream water temperatures, to reach full effect in September, didn’t just happen.  These glibly described “depletions” are primarily the excessive deliveries to Sacramento River Settlement Contractors to which this blog, CSPA, and others have been vociferously objecting since March.  And, of course, what is sunk is not the good ship Reclamation.  It is the year’s cohorts of Sacramento River salmon, just like in the disasters of 2014 and 2015.

Shasta-Keswick Storage Releases to the Upper Sacramento River

In 2021, Reclamation has not heeded the lessons learned in the 2013-2015 drought.  In 2021, Reclamation has not even implemented the feeble salmon-saving drought actions it applied in 2014 and 2015.

  1. April-May Keswick storage releases were higher in 2021 than 2014 (+257 TAF) and 2015 (+185 TAF) (Figure 1). Reclamation restricted releases in 2014 and 2015 in April-May to preserve Shasta’s cold-water pool.  It did no such thing in 2021.
  2. The higher releases in 2021 led to depleted storage in Shasta Reservoir (Figure 2). Storage at the end of May 2021 was 200 TAF lower than in May 2014, after having been 200 TAF higher at the beginning of April.
  3. The measures to maintain steady flow/stage and water temperature prescribed for drought year 2015 were not applied in 2021. In 2021 operations reverted to the 2014 regime, or worse.

Spawning Conditions for Winter Run Salmon

Winter-run salmon spawn from April to August, with a June-July peak in the ten miles of river downstream of Keswick Dam.  Early season (April-May) flow and water temperature conditions were erratic in 2014, 2015, and 2021 (Figures 1-4).  Rising flows and water temperatures stimulate the spawning migration and maturation leading up to the spawn.  Water temperature above 65ºF hinder migrations and stress adult spawners.  Water temperatures above 60ºF delay spawning and stress eggs in female salmon and eggs/embryos in redds.

  1. Conditions in 2014 proved devastating for the salmon spawn because of high water temperatures in late summer as Reclamation lost access to Shasta’s cold-water pool due to low storage. In addition,  a late summer drop of 2-3 feet in the stage height of the Sacramento River downstream of Keswick Dam caused spawning interruption and redd stranding (Figure 3).
  2. Despite concerted efforts in 2015 to retain storage, to maintain steady flows (and stage), and to sustain colder water releases, water temperature proved too high (>55ºF) for good egg/embryo survival. The lesson learned led to the current target for good survival of <53ºF in Keswick releases.
  3. Operations in 2021 were devastating, starting with high spring water temperatures, followed by a short period of good conditions in late June designed to stimulate spawning, before higher water temperature (Figure 4) and falling stage height greeted later winter-run spawners and egg/embryos/fry in redds.

Migration Conditions for Adult Salmon in Lower Sacramento River

Water temperatures in the lower Sacramento River 100-200 miles downstream of Shasta Dam remained far from typical in 2021 (Figure 5).  For the most part, water temperature from May through August were above the minimum stress level of 68ºF, and above the 72ºF avoidance level for weeks at a time.  These conditions not only affected the late migration of winter-run salmon, but also that of the spring-run (in spring) and fall-run (in summer) who spawn in early fall.

Summary

In summary, Reclamation’s operations of Shasta Reservoir have been as bad in 2021 as they were in 2014 and 2015, or worse.

Future posts will discuss more aspects of the failures of Reclamation’s Shasta operations in 2021.

Figure 1. Water releases from Keswick Dam (river mile 300) to the lower Sacramento River near Redding CA, April-August 2014, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 2. Shasta Reservoir storage (acre-feet) April-August in 2014, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 3. River Stage in Sacramento River below Keswick Dam April-August in 2014, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 4. Water temperature in Sacramento River below Keswick Dam April-August 2014, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 5. Water temperature in the lower Sacramento River at Wilkins Slough (river mile 120) May-August 2021, along with average for past 13 years. Note that the State’s year-round water quality standard for the lower Sacramento River is for water temperature to remain below 68ºF.

A Tale of Two Below-Normal Water Years – 2016 and 2020 More Shasta Reservoir Solutions to Save Salmon

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Water years 2016 and 2020 were below-normal water years in the Central Valley. Water year 2016 followed three critically dry, drought years, whereas 2020 followed two wet years (2017 and 2019) and one normal (2018) year. So one might assume that 2020 would have been better for Sacramento River salmon than 2016. But it ain’t so – because two different federal administrations were managing Shasta operations. The Trump administration’s policy to “maximize deliveries” of water that began in 2020 had consequences that turned deadly for salmon in critically dry 2021.

First and foremost, Shasta Reservoir storage in 2016 was surprisingly about 500,000 acre-feet or more higher than it was in 2020 after the first of April (Figure 1). Although water year 2020 started out nearly 2 million acre-feet (MAF) higher after a wet year, Shasta storage rose sharply in 2016, nearly filling (4.6 MAF capacity) with winter rain. But the real question is why reservoir storage did not recover in spring 2020. The reason is simply that in 2020, high spring and early summer reservoir releases for water deliveries released water from Shasta almost as fast as it was coming in (Figure 2). If in mid-March, when the reservoir storage was at 3.5 MAF in both years, similar storage-release constraints were in place in 2020 as in 2016, then 2020 would have ended the summer about 500,000 acre-feet higher than it did, near the 2016 storage level (Figure 3).

As a consequence of the storage difference and summer reservoir management, water temperatures downstream of Shasta Reservoir were significantly higher in 2020 than they were in 2016 (Figures 4 and 5). One reason for this was a much reduced volume of the Shasta Reservoir cold-water pool in 2020 compared to 2016 (Figure 6).

In conclusion, the Bureau of Reclamation managed water for winter-run salmon in normal water year 2016 much better than it did in normal water year 2020. Knowing the reservoir would likely not fill in 2020, Reclamation should have deployed a more conservative spring and summer release pattern, similar to what it did in 2016, to sustain cold-water releases from the reservoir through the summer and fall.

Figure 1. Shasta Reservoir water storage (AF) in 2016 and 2020.

Figure 2. Keswick Reservoir to the lower Sacramento River from April-October in 2016 and 2020.

Figure 3. Shasta Reservoir storage in 2016 and 2020 along with author-calculated adjusted release for 2020 if flow release pattern in 2016 (Figure 2) had been employed.

Figure 4. Water temperature below Shasta Dam April-October 2016 and 2020.

Figure 5. Water temperature below Keswick Dam April-October 2016 and 2020. Note target safe water temperature for salmon spawning and egg incubation is 53ºF.

Figure 5. Water temperature below Keswick Dam April-October 2016 and 2020. Note target safe water temperature for salmon spawning and egg incubation is 53ºF.

Figure 6. Coldwater pool volume (TAF) in Shasta Reservoir in 2016 and 2020, and other years.

A Tale of Three Critically Dry Years – More Shasta Reservoir Solutions to Save Salmon

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Shasta Reservoir is low again at the end of summer in drought year 2021.  The pattern is very similar to critically dry years 2014 and 2015 (Figure 1) that resulted in the loss of access to Shasta’s cold water and failure of the winter-run salmon spawn in the summer.  Year 2021 is leading to another failure of the winter-run salmon spawn and fry production.  Shasta’s cold-water pool supply is depleted, and river releases are too warm (Figure 2).  Water temperatures downstream of Shasta held in 2020 (Figure 2) despite high water releases (Figure 3), because 2020 had 1 million acre-feet more storage at the beginning of the year than either 2014 or 2021 (Figure 1).

The three disaster years could have had different outcomes if as little as 300,000 acre-feet of additional storage had been available in 2013 and spring 2021.  If at the end-of-year 2013, storage had been 2 MAF rather than 1.7 MAF, and the additional 300,000 AF been carried into 2014 and 2015 and then used to protect fish, the 2014 and 2015 disasters could have been averted.  If the spring releases in 2021 had been minimized as in other drought years, then the 2021 disaster could have been averted.

One reasonable strategy for Shasta Reservoir’s storage problems is minimum end-of-year storage prescriptions based on initial storage and water year type, and limiting releases in spring after dry years when storage is at or below 2 MAF.  Goals should be set for the next year based on initial conditions end-of-year storage (Figure 1).  As stated in a previous post, it is no longer enough to set end-of-September storage targets.  Climate change means in part that more autumn months are very dry. Exports in the fall (and a transfer season now extended through November) pull down CVP storage or at least slow reservoir refill.  Storage at the end of November or end of December needs to an explicit part of the carryover calculus.  Figure 1 shows end-of-November as the requirement.

Proposed Operating Storage Rules

  • Wet Year – High ending storage required (3 MAF minimum e-o-y storage – 11, 17, 19);
  • After Wet Year – if following year turns normal or dry, but reservoir fills, target is 2.5 MAF e-o-y storage (12, 16, and 18); if reservoir does not fill, target is 2.0 MAF (13, 20);
  • Critical Year – if critically dry with low storage, target e-o-y storage is 1.25 MAF (14, 15, 21).

Proposed Operating Release Rule

  • After a Drier Year – if storage is at or below 2 MAF at the beginning of a year and is below 2.5 MAF by the end of March, then April-May Shasta Reservoir releases should be limited to sustain and support in achieving higher summer storage and an e-o-y storage of 1.25 MAF. This decision needs to be made in April, based on a conservative runoff forecast methodology.

 Past Performance 2011-2021

  • 2013-2015 – Critical Dry Years – In 2013, storage fell about 300,000 AF below the 2 MAF e-o-y target, leaving 2014 e-o-y at a deficit that carried over into 2015. That led directly to the loss of access to Shasta’s cold water in summer-fall 2014 and 2015.
  • 2021 – Critical Dry Year – In 2021, Shasta Reservoir failed to regain its starting storage, not because 2020 ended from a storage deficit, but because of excessive releases in April and May (Figure 3).

 In summary, the 2014, 2015, and 2021 salmon production disasters in the upper Sacramento River salmon spawning reach below Shasta Reservoir could have been averted by following simple reasonable criteria for end-of-year minimum storage and stricter criteria for storage releases in spring of drought years.   This presumes, of course, that Reclamation would not have otherwise misused the water thus saved.

Figure 1. Shasta Reservoir daily-average storage levels in acre-ft, 2014-2021. Red circles are suggested minimum target criteria for those year types. Red arrows are years in hindsight the criteria were not met.

Figure 2. Keswick Reservoir release daily-average water temperature, May-October 2014, 2020, and 2021. Target maximum release temperature for salmon spawning in the 10-mile spawning reach below Keswick is 53oF (red line). Note Reclamation’s 2021 stated plan was to maintain target temperatures only at peak spawning in late June, but not in the early (late Apr-early June) or late (July-August) portions of the spawning period. Note also the lost access to the cold-water pool in September 2014 and October 2020. Access to the cold water is being lost in mid-August 2021.

Figure 3. Shasta Reservoir releases April-October in years 2014, 2020, and 2021. Note high releases in spring 2021 compared to 2014 in April-May period (difference was 240,000 acre-feet).

American River Water Forum 2.0 – The Future for American River Salmon and Steelhead

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Conditions in the lower American River have been bad all year, and are getting worse.1 Folsom Reservoir storage never recovered this spring and is critically low this summer (Figure 1). Releases from reservoir to the river have been low (Figure 2), resulting in excessively warm river water temperatures (Figure 3).

In a recent post on the Water Forum’s blog, Jessica Law, the new executive director of the American River Water Forum, described current conditions for the lower American River:

I won’t sugarcoat it. Conditions in the river will be bad. However, the Water Forum and our partners are working hard to ensure conditions are as good as they can possibly be, and to minimize harm to fish and habitat. As you may have seen on the news, we began this year with a near-normal snowpack. In most years, the snowpack melts and feeds our lakes and rivers. This year, the snowpack disappeared in the span of several weeks, soaking into the dry soil or evaporating—perhaps foreshadowing what may turn out to be the case study for climate change impacts on our water supplies and environment.

In a recent interview with Matt Weiser posted in Maven’s Notebook, Ms. Law further elaborated about the update of the original Water Forum Agreement from the year 2000.

“The biggest thing we’ve done is develop and implement a Modified Flow Management Standard with Reclamation that governs water movement in the Lower American River and optimizes conditions for fish. So that’s huge. …

But at some point, nature is moving faster than we can keep up. This year, with another extreme drought in play, is a great example of that. We had better water storage in all reservoirs coming out of a dry year than we ever had. This was very intentional by Reclamation and the Department of Water Resources. Still, we’re in a really bad situation this year.

Yet there is more to the story than natural conditions. Notwithstanding the Modified Flow Management Standard, fisheries in the lower American River have been struggling for many years.2

Reservoir inflows are low and water temperatures are high in summer of drier years (Figures 3 and 4), because Reclamation fails to conserve storage and the reservoir’s cold-water pool in most years. In the drier years, high June releases to meet Delta requirements and/or export demands lead to lower summer storage and high July water temperatures (Figures 1-3). Low reservoir storage levels lead to lack of access to the cold-water pool. Peaking power releases in afternoon-evening period draw warmer water from the surface of the reservoir (Figure 5).

A part of the solution to the problem is to have strict rules on end-of-year storage (Figure 7):

  1. 500,000 AF in high-storage years
  2. 350,000 AF in intermediate-storage years
  3. 250,000 AF in low-storage years

It is no longer enough to set end-of-September storage targets. Climate change means in part that more autumn months are very dry. Exports in the fall (and a transfer season now extended through November) pull down CVP storage or at least slow reservoir refill. Storage at the end of November or end of December needs to an explicit part of the carryover calculus. Figure 7 shows end-of-November as the requirement.

Complying with these rules (criteria) would occur through strict management of summer-fall storage releases. It would begin with the higher requirements for high-storage years, when there is water to manage. This would help prevent excessive drawdown from cascading into catastrophic conditions in one year.

Conserving storage in spring of drier years is also important in maximizing water storage for the beginning of summer. Use of Folsom Reservoir to meet short-term Delta water quality demands in winter and spring of drier years like 2021 (Figure 6) exacerbates summer storage and water temperature problems. This also wreaks havoc on the lower American River’s steelhead spawning habitat and salmon and steelhead rearing habitat.3

What is running away from managers of the lower American River is not only climate conditions. It is also the relentless pressure on other Central Valley Project (CVP) and State Water Project (SWP) reservoirs that forces Folsom Reservoir to shoulder more of the burden than it can bear. The explicit goal of “maximizing deliveries” in purpose-and-need statements of the 2019 Biological Opinions for the operation of the CVP and SWP are just one aspect of this pressure.

The over-delivery of irrigation water from Shasta Reservoir to Sacramento River Settlement Contractors in the spring and summer of 2021 made much less water from Shasta available to meet Delta water quality needs. Hence, the sudden demands on Folsom. There is a direct line between deliveries along the Sacramento and the amount of water in storage at Folsom Reservoir. These related problems must be solved to allow implementation of Folsom storage levels to be truly protective.

In summary, Water Forum 2.0 should focus on conserving Folsom Reservoir’s cold-water pool, providing access to the cold-water pool, minimizing the adverse effects of peaking power on river water temperature, and minimizing use of Folsom storage for short-term Delta water needs. While much of the focus must be on drier years, especially years like 2015 and 2021, overuse in high-storage type years can also lead to future problems.

For more detail on the salmonids and their habitat conditions in the lower American River see https://www.calfish.org/Portals/2/Programs/CentralValley/LAR_RST/docs/2020%20LAR%20RST%20Emigration%20Monitoring.pdf .

Figure 1. Folsom Reservoir storage patterns in four drier years: 2001, 2008, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 2. Folsom/Nimbus Reservoir releases to the American River at Fair Oaks in June-July of four drier years: 2001, 2008, 2015, and 2021.

Figure 3. Water temperature in the lower American River at William Pond gage in June-July of four drier years: 2001, 2008, 2015, and 2021. Red line is the upper limit of water temperature considered safe for salmonids.

Figure 4. Dry years 2001, 2015, and 2021 June-July inflow to Folsom Reservoir. Note 2015 and 2021 were very similar.

Figure 5. 48 hours of flow (cfs/100) and water temperature (oF) from Folsom Dam beginning 7/26/21 at 08:00 hours.

Figure 6. Folsom Reservoir daily-average storage releases (cfs) October 2020 to July 2021. Note each rectangle represents approximately 15,000 acre-ft of storage water. The three peaks in spring represent approximately 100,000 acre-ft of the end-of-June storage in Figure 1, or roughly about half the difference between 2015 and 2021 beginning-of-the-summer storage. Higher releases at the end of 2020 also contributed to the difference, along with low precipitation and snowmelt in 2021.

Figure 7. Folsom Reservoir daily-average storage (acre-feet) 2000-2021. Recommended minimum storage criteria are shown by circles: blue for high-storage years; light blue for intermediate-storage years; yellow for low-storage years. Red arrows are years that grossly exceeded such criteria.